Asean có thể là đối trọng kinh tế và chính trị trong khu vực đối với sự trỗi dậy của Trung Quốc?

security in the society and po- litical existence of the bloc, contributing to the over- all global security and stability in the region due to its geo-strategic, geo - political and geo-military po- sition. We carry out comparative studies between ASEAN and China based on sound theoretical frame- work encompassing selected security issues and secu- rity concerns in respect of two suggestively proposed interrelated dimensions25,35–37: macroeconomic se- curity (includingmainly foreign trade and investment relations) and existential (to be or not to be) security (including geo-strategic, geo-political, geo-military position and identity). The security issues considered under such dimensions always come together, strictly determine each other and, of course, will certainly pose real big challenges for ASEAN. Consequently, if those security issues and concerns are not solved and 251 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 Table 1: Security issues and concerns - framework for global & regional security analysis Conventional security issues Unconventional security issues Asymmetry of interests (of developed and developing countries) The rise of cryptocurrency Illegal migration Cyber-threats: -Information warfare Global terrorism, extremism and Nationalism Cyber-threats: -Cyber-terrorism National defense spending Cyber-threats: -Cyber-crime Regional conflicts and territorial disputes Cyber-threats: -Cyber-espionage Trade and currency warfare (protectionism) Energy and environmental concerns Source: Author’s synthesis Table 2: Security issues and concerns - framework for national security analysis External security issues Internal security issues Climate change and natural disaster Internal asymmetry of social interests Energy and natural resources disputes Political instability Territorial (land, sea water and air space) disputes Corruption scandals Sustainable economic growth and global trade warfare consequences (protectionism) Source: Author’s dealt properly and, especially in a close, interactive re- lation with each other, they could hinder the whole process of ongoing integration, consolidation and de- velopment of ASEAN in order to counterbalance ris- ing China in global and regional stage, in a pursuit and defense of its core, undisputed interests. Those security issues, both in macroeconomic and existen- tial terms are the basis for the ASEAN-China compar- ative study to find out disadvantages and advantage s of ASEAN (in relation to China) in each of detailed aspects of mentioned security issues. The result of carried out comparative study is served to find out an answer to the question introduced in the title of this article: “Could ASEAN be an economic and political counterbalance to rising China in the region?” RESULTS Comparing ASEAN and China in the Macroeconomic Aspect of Security Issues There is a real concern that ASEAN countries are in- creasingly reliant on Chinese economy and China’s trade and investment influence is spreading rapidly. For example, Philippines have been battered by China’s ban on banana imports in 2012 on the grounds that it does not guarantee quarantine safety standards. The ban was lifted several years later when President Rodrigo Duterte decided to pursue a friendlier stance towards Beijing. According to Duterte, in the long run, Philippines still benefits from China’ s economic growth and Philippines sim- ply cannot ignore China due to its huge and potential market. However, his anxiety is great because China is aware of its power and knows how to use it ac- cordingly. Any sector in ASEAN economies that de- pends too much on the outside, such as Thai tourism industry, Philippines banana industry and Indone- sian fishing industry, are vulnerable due to China’s er- ratic behavior. “We can imagine how easy it would be for China to hinder others’ industries”, said Dane Chamorro, Southeast Asia ’s director of Risk Control in Singapore38. More than a year ago, leaders of the ruling National League Party in Malaysia expressed concern after Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak brought about $ 34 billion worth of economic cooper- ation agreements during a visit to Beijing. They said the deal would not only pave the way for billions of dollars in debt, but also open the door for China to exert directly influence on Malaysia’s internal affairs. The railway project connecting Thailand and South- ern China through Lao People’s Democratic Repub- lic also met with strong opposition. Many comments in Thailand criticize China’s too excessive demands 252 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 on this project as well as China’ s overly high lending rates. However, finally, Thailand’ s cabinet approved the construction of the first phase of this project. The $ 7 billion railway project is just one of many infras- tructure development project s serving China’ s eco- nomic expansion policy in ASEAN. The general view of the plan to build China’ s $ 7 billion high-speed rail- way project in Laos is that this serve to connect Laos’ economic interests with China, at the same time aim- ing at increasing the influence of China in Laos 39. In Myanmar, China’s $ 10 billion pipeline project involv- ing in the well-known “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) project has sparked protests. People inMyanmarwere concerned because this project is threatening the en- vironment and local households were not fully com- pensated when being relocated to get the land for the project implementation. “China does not do anything to fulfill its obligations as mentioned in Aung San Suu Kyi’s report”, saidMaMarCho, one of the protest lead- ers who spoke to Reuters40. Greater economic de- pendence on China is another concern for some of ASEAN countries that suffered fundamental weak- nesses in their economy. For example, consump- tion growth in Indonesia and Philippines is stagnant; despite previously both countries have experienced higher level of GDP growth. FDI flows to Indone- sia, except from China, are slowing down. In Thai- land, the baht currency has been appreciated, putting high pressure on exporters. With significant connec- tivity and cross-border trade with some countries, re- cent reports suggest that China is expanding its eco- nomic impact in ASEAN through infrastructure de- velopment investments. At the same time, China and some ASEAN countries are trying to resolve disputes over maritime rights in the South China Sea. If these disputes remain unsettled, it may be possible for Bei- jing to use its economic leverage to promote strategic goals in the South China Sea and beyond. Further- more, in a longer perspective, China can also try to acquire infrastructure assets in ASEAN countries to serve its national interests. The head of the Depart- ment for ASEANAffairs underThailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suriya Chindawaongse, emphasized this important fact at the June 2018 negotiation on Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) 41. ASEAN’s trade with China has tripled during pe- riod 2005-2015, that is higher than the increase in intra-ASEAN trade and trade with South Korea. The share of advanced economies in ASEAN’ s total trade has been declining, while China’s share is increasing. South Korea’s contribution is undoubtedly rising, but still modest compared to China’s. As multination- als have been engaged in individual production ac- tivities in many countries over the past few decades, China and the ASEAN economies have become in- terconnected in a network of production and logis- tics systems, thus increasing their interdependence. According to national data, by 2015, all the ASEAN economies, except Singapore, had higher trade deficit with China during the period 2008-2015. This has led to concerns for national policymakers to rethink about their foreign trade policies with China. China is an important destination for ASEAN’s exports and more important for its imports to serve its needs of production and consumption. This proves that China is benefiting more from its access to ASEAN market rather than the opposite. No other trading partner, except the ASEAN itself, has such an important posi- tion formost of the exports and imports of all ASEAN economies. Since the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) was created in 2010, China-ASEAN trade has grown rapidly, with an average annual increase of nearly 20%. Regarding free movement and tourist in- dustry, in 2016, ASEANwelcomed 18.61 million Chi- nese tourists, accounting for 17% of the total number of tourists to ASEAN42. It can be said that the im- portance of China in the entire ASEAN tradingmodel is increasing. Particularly for Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia, the countries with a growing trade deficit with China, they are more dependent on China for imported goods and raw materials. In 2013, Viet- nam’s trade deficit with China was more than $ 23 billion; in 2014 it was nearly $ 29 billion; in 2015 it was more than $ 33 billion; in 2016 and 2017 it has dropped to over $ 28 billion and over $ 22.7 billion re- spectively43. Importantly, China is a key export mar- ket for some of ASEAN countries, led by Laos and Myanmar. Based on this, it can be seen that the trade dependence of ASEAN countries on China is high compared to other trading partners. That is likely to put China in a stronger position to push up their po- litical agenda in the region, for example, the maritime claims or the pressure on smaller ASEAN states to maintain distance from the US security and military presence in Asia. Among ASEAN countries, China regards Cambodia as a cordial friend and leverages re- lationship with this country to influence regional pol- icy decisions as it has ever done in the past. In an- other area, the importance of China as a foreign di- rect investor is still modest. China’s FDI is only im- portant for Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. However, the share of Chinese FDI in A SEAN is constantly in- creasing. “ASEAN is an attractive FDI destination for China because of its fast growing market and popu- lation. Developing countries in ASEAN need FDI to offset the irfiscal imbalance and meet infrastructure development needs. China will bring in capital and 253 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 expertise and China’s investment in ASEAN will con- tinue to grow due to the OBOR initiative”, said analyst Lee Ju Ye fromMaybank in Singapore44. China dom- inates ASEAN in terms of trade exchange and main- tains its superior position as the largest trading part- ner with all ASEAN countries. On the contrary, for China, ASEAN are the third largest trading partner, while for the US, ASEAN is only the fourth largest trading partner. However, the US still dominates in ASEAN in the field of FDI as the region received to- tal of $ 226 billion in 2015 45. The fact that a num- ber of countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines or Malaysia, has slowed down in 2015 is a testimony to the fact that most of them are experiencing a sharp drop in exports as a result of the slowdown in Chinese economy. Thus, it can be said that the surge in trade exchange between China and ASEAN is only short- lived and depends largely on Chinese GDP growth that has been slowed down in recent years. While, compared to the level of large-scale and long-term in- vestments in the ASEAN, China cannot compare with the US and other world economic powerhouses 46. Table 3, for the illustration purposes, will present two-way FDI, ODA flow from ASEAN to China and from China to ASEAN; two-way import, export from ASEAN to China and from China to ASEAN in the period 2010-2018. ComparingASEANandChina in theExisten- tial Aspect of Security Issues At present, China and ASEAN countries are commit- ted to maintaining a peaceful and stable environment to focus on mutual economic development. How- ever, the current burning issue is South China Sea disputes, a major obstacle in strengthening cooper- ation between China and ASEAN. China’s threat for ASEAN countries still exists, as China is constantly increasing its activities in sovereignty disputes, build- ing illegal artificial islands in the South China Sea, boosting defense expenditure to upgrade and mod- ernize military capability, especially the navy force. All of that have caused deep concern for all coun- tries in the Asia Pacific region and for the interna- tional community as well. Situated in theAsia-Pacific, ASEAN is the most geo-politically, geo-strategically and geo-militarily sensitive region of the world. As Myanmar has successfully ended decades of isolation, ASEAN’s policy of attracting Myanmar has been crit- icized by the West, but it has helped lay the ground- work for a peaceful transition from military regime to a full democracy. Comparing with the West’ s isolation policy in Syria, it certainly does not lead to the same result. Certainly, ASEAN is not per- fect. In short, it looks like ASEAN is moving in crab’s style, two steps forward, one step back and one step across. But we cannot deny ASEAN ’s long-term progress in preserving its regional interest. Currently, ASEAN is the only credible platform for geopolitical engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN is also unique in its ability to convene meetings involving all the world powers, fromUS and EuropeanUnion (EU) to China and Russia. However, at present, ASEAN continues to be facing serious challenges. Territo- rial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea have created deep divisions within ASEAN, between those countries directly involved in (such as: Viet- nam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei) and those countries that have nothing in common (Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambo- dia). The increased geopolitical competition between the US and China has created a greater threat to the cohesion of the bloc. In addition, partly due to that, domestic politic al situation of some ASEANmember states, including Malaysia and Thailand, are becom- ing increasingly chaotic 49. From the end of the first decade of the 21st century, both China andUS are try- ing to draw ASEAN towards themselves. ASEAN has become an important factor in building and maintaining political stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN is at the center of con- necting and reconciling conflicts, promoting coop- eration for peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region50. The new slogan in China’s for- eign policy “building a community of common des- tiny” must start in Southeast Asia. If China suc- ceeds in this, they will once again prove the global viability of the Chinese model51. ASEAN political thought is based on the aforementioned ASEAN Po- litical Security Community (APSC), one of three pil- lars of ASEAN Community, to elevate political and security cooperation to a new height, with the par- ticipation and contribution of all possible external partners, to ensure that ASEAN member states co- exist peacefully with each other and with countries in the region and the outside world in an environ- ment of justice, democracy and harmony. The APSC is not a military bloc, not a military alliance or joint foreign policy. The APSC shall promote a com- prehensive approach to security, including political, economic, cultural-social and environmental aspects; strengthen political and diplomatic cooperation, de- velop and share common standards of conduct; pro- mote the trend of not usingmilitary forces and resolve all disputes by peaceful means; retain open relations 254 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 Table 3: FDI, ODA, import, export from ASEAN to China and from China to ASEAN in 2010-2018 (in billion USD) Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 FDI from China to ASEAN 12,5 11,1 8,6 7,3 7,1 11,6 7,8 11,3 12,4 FDI from ASEAN to China 9,81 10,23 12,01 12,4 12,83 12,3 13,91 14,1 15,26 ODA from China to ASEAN 1,3 1,32 1,49 1,52 1,72 2,3 2,341 2,67 3,2 ODA from ASEAN to China 2,36 3,128 4,55 4,66 5,201 5,123 5,34 6,142 6,26 China’s export to ASEAN 124,45 170,08 204,2 244,04 272,05 197,24 256,1 279,1 282,1 ASEAN’s export to China 117,7 225,12 320.9 403,6 437,15 448,7 468,12 513,6 625,4 China’s im- port from ASEAN 138,56 192,771 195,821 199,559 208,214 143,13 196,4 235,7 265,14 ASEAN’s import from China 10,55 200 38,7 40,1 42,85 22,4 43,4 48,61 14,58 Source: Author’s synthesis from UNCOMTRADE (UN, 2018) 47 and China Customs 48repor t with external partners and maintain ASEAN’ s cen- tral role in the regional architecture52. Chinese po- litical thought, expressed by “Chinese dream banner”, brings together four powerful, comprehensive recon- structions of China’s new face based on the charac- teristics of Xi Jin Ping’s thought. Those four com- prehensive reconstructions include: (1) comprehen- sive wealthy social development, (2) comprehensive economic reform, (3) comprehensive national rule of law, and (4) comprehensive strict management of the China Communist Party. By February 2015, the state Xinhua News Agency determined clearly that this is the strategic layout and political platform for the country’s construction anddevelopment in the pe- riod of new era 53. Both ASEAN and China are facing many challenges that might turn into the threats to their existential security. Challenges for ASEAN ahead are : (1) in- ternational terrorist organizations such as IS (Islamic States), Al-Qaeda which after heavy casualties in Iraq and Syria are turning their operations to ASEAN countries, first in Islamic island states like Indonesia and Malaysia; (2) China and US are increasingly en- gaged in the South East Asia, involving ASEAN coun- tries in their geopolitical orientations. Sino-US com- petition puts ASEAN bloc ahead of the big challenge of recognizing and dealing with external pressures50. Challenges for China ahead are also noticeable. Xi Jin Ping’s continuous pursuit of excessive control over the China Communist Party has reversed decades of at- tempts to institutionalize Chinese politics. During his tenure, there have been rumors of unsuccessful coup attempts, with the most recent rumors appearing in December 2017. At the same time, Xi Jin Ping’s am- bitions have led China from being a hidden dragon during previous leaderships to being over-stretched abroad, from South East border areas to the remote Western locations. An increasingly provocative and aggressive foreign policy, expressed by undertakings of restoring territory, is pushing other countries into the alliance to protect them from Beijing’s expansion- ism54. On the South China Sea, ASEAN continues to reaffirm the agreed principles of the importance of peace, stability, security, safety, freedom of aerial and 255 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 maritime navigation; to respect the rule of law to re- solve disputes by peaceful means; to restrain and not to complicate the disputes; to demilitarize and to im- plement fully and effectively the DOC (Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea) and soon reach the COC (Code of Conduct in the South China Sea). Accordingly, on August 06, 2017, in Manila, the capital of Philippines, the adopted and negotiated framework between ASEAN and China on COC was officially launched. In parallel, before that happened, the XVIII Congress of China Communist Party in March 2013 set out the strategy of build- ing a maritime power, officially bringing the issue of maritime development into national defense strat- egy, emphasizing the building of maritime power as an indispensable choice to protect the national inter- est and to restore the Chinese nation. The develop- ment of China’ s maritime power has become particu- larly remarkable in the current context, as China con- tinues to aggressively violate the sovereignty and na- tional interests of other states in order to materialize its monopoly in the South China Sea 55. The outcome of ASEAN-China collaboration in politics and secu- rity between 1997 and 2003 is that China and ASEAN signed the joint statement towards the 21st century. Following the decision of the China-ASEAN sum- mit in 2000, China and ASEAN signed action plan against drug trafficking. In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea, Joint Declaration on China-ASEAN security in the field of non-traditional (unconventional) security, pledged to settle all dis- putes by peaceful means, laying an important legal basis for the implementation of cooperation between parties in the South China Sea. In 2003, the two sides issued the Joint Declaration on strategic partnerships, moving fromdialogue to strategic partnerships, open- ing up a period of comprehensive development across all sectors. In Bali 2003, China is the first major coun- try outside the region to sign Treaty of Amity and Co- operation with ASEAN with an aim to create impor- tant premise to ensure the security environment of the region. This will help promote the accession of ma- jor countries to this Treaty with ASEAN. Despite hav- ing an established strategic partnership with China, ASEAN countries are still concerning about Chinese threat to their existential security (“to be or not to be in the region”), but they regard China’ s economic rise as giving opportunity to all 56. Could ASEAN Counterbalance to China in the Region? Evidences for the “Yes” Answer A number of measures have been taken by ASEAN to resolve disputes in the South China Sea or to build trust among the parties to curb potential conflicts and prevent further military clashes, mainly through means of negotiation. Those measures are carried out collectively by the ASEAN as a whole, but they are im- possible to be taken individually by any single ASEAN member state. A number of documents regulating the national behavior in the South China Sea have been developed, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooper- ation in Southeast Asia in 1976, the Treaty of South- east Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 1995 and the Manila Declaration in 1992 (the first statement ex- pressing the common position of ASEAN countries on the issues of South China Sea). The Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea (November 4, 2002) is considered as a breakthrough in ASEAN-China relations on the South China Sea, and also shows ASEAN’s significant role in settling disputes in the region. Prior to the DOC, ASEAN had the idea of developing a Code of Conduct for par- ties in the South China Sea (COC). ASEAN adopted diplomaticmeasures, namely throughmultilateral ne- gotiations between nations in the region and with China to launch a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. In this context, ASEAN is capable of ad- dressing cross-border issues of the region that any sin- gle country cannot do. Disputes over sovereignty, ter- ritory, security, maritime safety, terrorism, arms con- trol, human and drug trafficking, climate change, wa- ter security, epidemics, migration and displacement, financial imbalances and international trade are re- gional or even interregional problems. Due to the scale of these problems, most of them are at regional level, their settlement should be carried out collec- tively, through regional mechanisms57. In this sense, ASEAN is an appropriate counterpart for China in solving common regional security issues of both mil- itary and non-military nature. In fact, China has been playing a leading role in the development of ASEAN-China relations, especially after 2003, when the two sides kicked off the process of realization of strategic partnership relations. This role has helped China to further improve its influence in ASEAN, particularly in the period 2003-2008. China’s political and diplomatic presence is everywhere. At the regional level, the Chinese delegation to ASEAN was formed. At the national level, in addition to the Chinese embassy in the capital of ASEAN countries, 256 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 Chinese consulates are present in most cities and ma- jor economic centers in ASEAN. Chinese leaders are welcomed in the capital of most ASEAN countries. China not only represent s an emerging powerhouse, China has also made itself one of the great finan- cial resources that many ASEAN countries have been waiting for. In the period 1997- 2010, many ASEAN leaders have praised China and its generous finan- cial support for their countries. Economically, since 2009, China has been ASEAN’s largest trading part- ner and the second largest export market58. ASEAN and China have had many negotiations on the COC (Code of Conduct of parties in the South China Sea) since China took over Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1995. The two sides exchanged COC drafts in March 2000, but due to many disagreements, the two sides could not reach the COC, only the Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was adopted in 2002. On 6 August 2012, the ASEAN and China’s ForeignMinisters adopted a draft of COC framework in Manila. According to the ambassador to China in ASEAN, Beijing plans to conduct more maritime cooperation programs with ASEAN such as joint maritime exercises, organizing workshops on coastal ecosystem assessment and conservation strat- egy in South China Sea, training on remote sensing satellite in marine environment, and opening a con- ference on communication safety and navigation in the South China Sea 41. It seems that despite its pre- dominant role in Asia, China needs same size or sim- ilar size partners for development and cooperation in order to solve common security issues, to support and benefit from mutual existence. At a press conference on the morning of August 31, 2018, representatives of the ASEAN-China Informa- tion Sharing Forum declared that ASEAN and China continued to strengthen cooperation in connecting information and developing digital economy, to im- prove the quality of cultural exchanges, economic, investment and trade cooperation. The Forum fo- cused on building information platforms in five key areas: (1) infrastructure, (2) information sharing, (3) technology cooperation, (4) economic and trade ser- vices and (5) human exchange. Accordingly, this year’s Forum will was held from 12 to 18 September, in Nanning, Guangxi province, at the same time as the ASEAN-China Fair (CAEXPO) and the ASEAN- China Business and Investment Summit (CABIS), one of the most important activities in the framework of ASEAN-China cooperation. The main topic is building the digital economy, the Forum gathered more than 2,000 delegates who are government offi- cials, representatives of ministries, sectors and local- ities; experts and scholars from universities and re- search institutes; business leaders fromASEAN coun- tries and China. The Forum featured nine sessions on digital economy on 5D technology, network cul- ture development, satellite application cooperation, e-commerce in order to exchange and make recom- mendations on future cooperation between ASEAN and China, to promote policy dialogue, connect in- frastructure, trade, capital and people exchange59. As seen above, ASEAN is appropriate partner for China in all aspects, not only in solving multifaceted com- mon security and economic issues but also multilat- eral exchange and cooperation for mutual develop- ment towards future shared vision in the context of digital economy and Industrial Revolution 4.0. Re- alistically speaking, China cannot benefit from rela- tionship with ASEAN taking individually relationship with each of its member state. Evidences for the “No” Answer China and theUS are increasingly engaged inASEAN, involving ASEAN in their geopolitical forces. Sino- US competition puts ASEAN ahead of the big chal- lenge of recognizing and dealing with external pres- sures50. Tim Huxley, regional director of the Inter- national Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Asia, at the World Economic Forum (WEF) ASEAN 2018 confirmed that the region’s balance of power is being challenged, with ASEAN nations being in an increas- ingly vulnerable position. Countries in this region are divided on their support for the US and China. He said at a session on the new power balance at the WEF ASEAN 2018 that China’s influence in the re- gion is on the increase, with its economic strength and geopolitical implications. In the South China Sea, China built and militarized islands, procuring arms such asmissiles, submarines and fighters. Huxley em- phasized that China set out important strategic objec- tives in the South China Sea not only as a matter of territorial sovereignty, but for the purpose of gaining access to the maritime resources under South China Sea. Huxley said that ASEAN hadmultilateral and bi- lateral consultations on the South China Sea issues, but there seemed to be no overall solution, and he is quite concerned about this60. Regarding the China’s strength and ASEAN’s passive role in counterbalancing this superpower, to promi- nent question from Xinhua News Agency’s Bangkok correspondent: “In the context of China’s continual growth and expansion, Xi Jin Ping’s initiative, such as 257 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 the OBOR (One Belt and One Road), it can be seen a clear imbalance of power over the South China Sea, while ASEAN seems to be relatively quiet and of no concern at all. In this circumstance who will take the lead in counterbalancing China ?” 61. Marty Natale- gawa responded: “We need to avoid trying to counter- balance China, which can be considered a meaning- less effort, not just forASEAN, but even for theUS. All political and social movements of ASEAN countries will be affected by China’s unprecedented power. So the question is not how to counter it, but how toman- age it and live with this strategic imbalance”62. Com- petition between the two superpowers pow er in the region is dividing ASEAN bloc and ASEAN nations within, and we have seen many methods of protec- tion, for example the withdrawal of the Cambodian opposition. This is the moment of time when ASEAN needs to get the best of current overall situation in the region or otherwise things will get worse 63. CONCLUSIONS ANDDISCUSSION The article summarizes current literature on interna- tional relations and security issues, puts forward some economic and political context appraisals and ana- lyzes the ongoing situation of ASEAN in the relation to China in multiple aspects. Hereafter, more de- tails associated with theoretical and practical contri- butions of this article are presented as major achieve- ments of authors: Conclusion and Theoretical contribution First and foremost, the article gives full understand- ing of complex essence (military and non-military nature) and multiple definitions of national security in context of the ongoing globalization process. Na- tional security could be defined by its specific goals, by using succession approach and be regarded as a pro- cess conditioned by global or national context, condi- tion and situation. Secondly, the article present a detailed overview of contemporary security issues, related concepts and notions (such as challenge, current threat and potential threat, real threat and sense of threat), their multidimensional (social, cultural, technologi- cal, economic, political, diplomatic andmilitary char- acter), multi-perspective (internal, external), mul- tifaceted (conventional and unconventional) and multi-level (global, regional supranational, national, social groups, families and individuals) character. All of that are based on a sound and solid literature re- view of relevant, multiple sources of world-class secu- rity related scientific journals. Thirdly, when it comes to the research methodology on security issues, the article proposes to borrow from disciplines of social sciences. However, security sci- ence should preserve both its originality (to have own distinctive specifics and to be separated from other scientific disciplines) and multidisciplinary character (to be at the crossroad of well-rounded traditional po- litical science, sociology, psychology, etc.). Fourthly, in terms of framework of research on secu- rity issues, at the global and regional level of security analysis the article propose classification into conven- tional and unconventional issues, at the national level – external and internal issues accordingly. The arti- cle provides justification for those classifications and highlights the critical importance of unconventional issues at the global level and, respectively, internal is- sues at national level. Finally, as globalization shapes processes that take place in all spheres of human activity, including econ- omy and security, those are areas of basic importance for human functioning in the contemporary world, mutually penetrating and dependent on each other. The article attaches important role of national gov- ernment in retaining global benefits and security for its citizens and enterprises, at the same time limiting all possible negative consequences. As a result, for the need of conducting comparative study between ASEAN andChina, a comprehensive research scheme was adopted that embraces those two parallel aspects of security issues: macroeconomic security and exis- tential security. The first one is associated with gen- eral economic power, trade and investment position and advantage while the second is related with geo- political identity (to be or not to be), geo-strategic po- sition and general geo-military capability of each re- searched object: ASEAN or China. Discussion and recommendation The article addresses a very interesting topic of se- curity science and security issues (strategic counter- balance) of the well-known research objects (ASEAN and China), and is based on strong relevant empiri- cal materials to support arguments of many hypothe- ses formulated and statements declared. As a basis for further detailed analysis, at the beginning, the ar- ticle gives an overview over ASEAN-China relation- ship and a full insight into the development history of each of them. In the most important section of the article, the comparative study between ASEAN and China based on the proposed comprehensive research scheme, many arguments are put forward to justify 258 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law and Management, 3(3):247- 261 that China’s dominant position in the overall rela- tionship with ASEAN bloc, both in terms of macroe- conomic security issues and political existential se- curity issues. China is both an economic and mili- tary powerhouse in the region. Looking at the trade and investment relationship over past years, most of ASEAN countries suffered from chronic trade and in- vestment deficit with China. ASEAN countries invest directly more in China than China invest in ASEAN. It is totally unacceptable andmust change soon, given the trend of colossal outflows of Chinese FDI around the world, especially in Africa. The real problem of ASEAN is not how strong and how big it is but is that ASEAN countries are not internally united to ex- ert common stance toward China in many aspects of their strategic economic and security relationship. This is similar to the European Union (EU) in coun- terbalancing the US economic hegemony. The prob- lem is not the size and scale of EU economy. As an open bloc, it could be enlarged by admitting new members from Eastern Europe and Balkan region to become the largest economy in the world. The prob- lem is how EU can be internally united to elaborate common stance toward the US and the world inmany strategic issues and to avoid the next exit of current member states and the uncomfortable situation of the union of two speeds. For both the EU and ASEAN, it is better to be smaller but internally united and strongly committed rather than to be a big but loose confederation of a large number of member states. ASEAN should show more solidarity and be strongly integrated within to avoid being treated as buffer zone or an area of geo-political domination and strategic game between China and US.This is the only possible way for ASEAN to counterbalance China or any other economic and political forces in the region or outside. COMPETING INTEREST The authors declare that they have no conflicts of in- terest. AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTION NguyenHoangTien has done the researchwork of the article; Ha VanDung has revised the article according to the Editor’s requirements. 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ASEAN – division but still of hope, BBC News; 2018. 260 Tạp chí Phát triển Khoa học và Công nghệ – Kinh tế-Luật và Quản lý, 3(3):247- 261 Open Access Full Text Article Bài Nghiên cứu 1Trường Đại học Quốc tế Sài Gòn 2Trường Đại học Ngân hàng Liên hệ Nguyễn Hoàng Tiến, Trường Đại học Quốc tế Sài Gòn Email: nguyenhoangtien@siu.edu.vn Lịch sử  Ngày nhận: 3/1/2019  Ngày chấp nhận: 28/4/2019  Ngày đăng: 30/9/2019 DOI : 10.32508/stdjelm.v3i3.565 Bản quyền © ĐHQG Tp.HCM. Đây là bài báo công bố mở được phát hành theo các điều khoản của the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. ASEAN có thể là đối trọng kinh tế và chính trị trong khu vực đối với sự trỗi dậy của Trung Quốc? Nguyễn Hoàng Tiến1,*, Hà Văn Dũng2 Use your smartphone to scan this QR code and download this article TÓM TẮT An ninh quốc gia làmột trong những yếu tố quan trọng nhất đối với xã hội, nền kinh tế và hệ thống chính trị của mỗi quốc gia. Đặc biệt, nó vô cùng quan trọng đối với sự ổn định, bền vững và thịnh vượng của mỗi quốc gia. Ngoài ra, đây cũng là ưu tiên hàng đầu đối với tất cả các nước ASEAN phải đối phó với Trung Quốc đang trỗi dậy liên tục trong tất cả các khía cạnh phát triển của khu vực châu Á - Thái Bình Dương. Bài báo này sử dụng phân tích nghiên cứu tính uống kết hợp với phân tích thực nghiệm so sánh để điều tra và tìm ra câu trả lời cho câu hỏi được nêu trong tiêu đề. Bài báo tiếp cận và coi an ninh và khoa học quân sự là lĩnh vực liên ngành của nghiên cứu đương đại. Đồng thời các lĩnh vực này được coi là một trong những nhánh nghiên cứu của khoa học xã hội. Vào đầu thế kỷ 21, mối quan hệ kinh tế cũng như quan hệ địa chính trị giữa Trung Quốc và ASEAN đã có nhiều tiến bộ và thay đổi tích cực theo hướng đi đúng đắn, phù hợp với các nguyên tắc chung về phát triển hòa bình và bảo đảm an ninh trong khu vực. Tuy nhiên, mối quan hệ hiện tại này vẫn còn nhiều khó khăn và trở ngại mà hai bên cần giải quyết và khắc phục để hưởng lợi từ những tiềm năng hiện có của nhau. Mục tiêu đầu tiên của bài viết này là tập trung vào mối quan hệ phức tạp chung giữa ASEAN và Trung Quốc có thể gây ra mối đe dọa và nguy hiểm thực sự cho các an ninh quốc gia các nước ASEAN do thiếu khả năng đối trọng với Trung Quốc đang trỗi dậy ở khu vực Châu Á Thái Bình Dương. Mục tiêu thứ hai của bài viết là đề xuất một số khuyến nghị hữu ích và giải pháp khả thi để bảo vệ sự an toàn của người dân, an ninh xã hội và nền kinh tế cùng với sự tồn tại chính trị của khối ASEAN. Từ khoá: ASEAN, Trung Quốc, phát triển kinh tế, vấn đề quân sự, Biển Đông Trích dẫn bài báo này: Hoàng Tiến N, Văn Dũng H. ASEAN có thể là đối trọng kinh tế và chính trị trong khu vực đối với sự trỗi dậy của Trung Quốc?. Sci. Tech. Dev. J. - Eco. Law Manag.; 3(3):247-261. 261