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Annual Review of Sociology, 13: 443-464. 217 VITA Luke Hendrik Cashen was born on July 25, 1972, in Great Yarmouth, England, to the parents of Fritz Hulen Cashen and Baukje Anneke Hoekstra-Cashen, and to the sister of Carrie Agatha Cashen Trosclair. He is the grandson of Thomas Hulen Cashen, June Roberta Welch-Cashen, Hendrik Reitse Hoekstra, and Agatha Alida Anna de Winter-Hoekstra. It was not until 1984 when Luke moved to the United States and settled in New Iberia, Louisiana. Prior to moving to the United States, Luke lived with his family in England, Singapore, Borneo, and The Netherlands. Upon his graduation from Catholic High School of New Iberia in 1990, Luke attended Louisiana State University where he obtained a Bachelor of Science in economics in 1994. After graduation, he worked as a Management Associate for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in New Orleans. Luke later returned to Louisiana State University on a full-time basis and graduated with a Master of Business Administration degree in 1997. Based on the influence of Dr. Lamar Jones, Luke decided to pursue a doctorate in Business Administration (Management) with a predominant focus on strategic management. He is scheduled to graduate in December 2005. Luke is currently a tenure track faculty member in the Management and Marketing Department at Nicholls State University in Thibodaux, Louisiana. Additionally, he teaches for the Executive Education Program in the E. J. Ourso College of Business at Louisiana State University. Prior to accepting a position at Nicholls State University, Luke was an Instructor at Louisiana State University and an adjunct instructor at the University of Louisiana – Lafayette.