Ngân hàng, tín dụng - Chapter 14: Understanding financial contracts
Contracting and Firm Continuum (Cont.)
– Small firms
• External reputations are difficult to establish
• Most activities are beyond the public’s scrutiny
• Therefore, need proxies to demonstrate they are low risk and
committed to not shifting their risk profiles
– Outside collateral or personal guarantees place more of the owner’s
wealth at risk
– Inside collateral, bank files a lien against collateral
– Loan covenants prevent risk shifting by explicitly constraining borrower
behavior
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1Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.
Chapter 14
Understanding
Financial
Contracts
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-2
Learning Objectives
• Differentiate among the different mechanisms of
external financing of firms
• Explain why mechanisms of external financing
depend upon firm size
• Understand how financial contracts may reduce
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
of asymmetric information
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-3
Introduction
• Chapter focuses on financial contracts between
lenders and borrowers
• Non-traded financial contracts are tailor-made
to fit the characteristics of the borrower
• In business financing, the differences in
contracting can be great, both in terms of how
financial instruments are originated and in the
characteristics of the terms of contract
2Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-4
Introduction (Cont.)
• Asymmetric information—problems
associated with the availability of information
about the borrowers who seek funding
• Apply this concept to analysis to contrast the
differences between consumer and business
financing
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-5
How Business Obtains Financing
• Businesses need funds for a variety of reasons
– Finance permanent assets such as plant and
equipment
– Finance the acquisition of another business
– Finance working capital—inventory or accounts
receivable
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-6
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses
– Small firms—assets less than $10 million
– Vast majority are privately owned with ownership
concentrated in a single family
– Generally do not need external financing beyond trade
credit—delayed payment offered by suppliers
– Profitable firms may have sufficient capital to be self-
financing
– Banks are most likely source of external financing
3Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-7
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses (Cont.)
– Provide funds via a short-term loan or line of credit (L/C) for
either working capital or purchase of plant and equipment
• Short-term loan—negotiated contract with short maturity
• Line of Credit
– Bank extends a credit for specified period of time
– The borrowing firm can draw down funds against L/C
– Credit Rationing—insures borrower has access to funds even if bank
would prefer to curtail new loans
• When financing capital assets the maturity of the loan is typically less
than life span of the asset
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-8
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses (Cont.)
– Bank Loan Origination (Figure 14.1)
• Locate a bank that meets your needs, usually through a
referral
• The bank’s loan officer conducts a complete credit
analysis
– Review borrower’s financial statements
– Visit the place of business
– Assesses the managerial strengths/weaknesses of borrower
– Provides an opportunity to develop a one-on-one relationship
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-9
FIGURE 14.1 Bank loan origination.
4Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-10
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses (Cont.)
– Bank Loan Origination (Figure 14.1) (Cont.)
– Obtain additional information about the firm
– Obtain credit report on the firm and borrower
– Address any concerns with the borrower
• Loan is approved by the bank
– Small loan approved by a loan officer
– Larger loans are approved by more senior officers
– Above a certain amount must get approval from loan committee
– Borrower and bank negotiate terms of the loan
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-11
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses (Cont.)
– Unique features of a small business loan
• During application period and after the loan is granted,
develop a relationship between bank and borrower
• Banks offer a wide menu of options to borrower
• Loans are often collateralized
– Pledging of assets against the loan
– Secured lender—bank has the right to petition the bankruptcy
court to sell the asset pledged as collateral to satisfy the loan
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-12
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses (Cont.)
– Unique features of a small business loan (Cont.)
• Loans are often collateralized (Cont.)
– Unsecured lender—have right to proceeds from sale of assets
after secured lenders have been paid
– Owner may pledge personal assets as collateral
• Loan can be guaranteed by the owner
– Borrower is personally liable for any unpaid balance
– Lender may require a personal financial statement of the
borrower
5Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-13
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses (Cont.)
– Unique features of a small business loan (Cont.)
• Loan may contain restrictive covenants
– Covenant—promises that the company makes to the bank
regarding their future actions and strategies
– The bank may require an audited financial statement to verify the
convents have not been broken
– More restrictive covenants are linked to actions indicating the
company has become riskier
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-14
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Small Businesses (Cont.)
– Unique features of a small business loan (Cont.)
• Loan may contain restrictive covenants (Cont.)
– If violated, bank may demand immediate payment of loan
– Possible for the borrower to renegotiate the terms of the loan
to reflect higher risk
• Maturity of small business loans rarely exceeds 5 years
• With very small firms, often loan is strictly dependent on
creditworthiness of the individual not the small business
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-15
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Midsize Businesses
– Assets between $10 million and $150 million
– Large enough to no longer be bank-dependent for
external debt financing, but not large enough to issue
traded debt in the public bond market
– Some are likely to be publicly owned—issue equity
traded in the over-the-counter market
– Can either be owner managed or managed by
someone other than the owner
6Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-16
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Midsize Businesses (Cont.)
– For short-term debt, principally rely on commercial banks
– Depending on size of debt and bank, can use either local or
non-local banks
– Typically have covenants placed on the loan and may pledge
collateral
– Revolving Line of Credit--access to longer-term debt
financing through their commercial bank that combines an
L/C with intermediate-term loan
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-17
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Midsize Businesses (Cont.)
– Long-term debt financing is often provided by non-
bank institutions
• Mezzanine debt funds provide loans to smaller midsize
companies
• Private Placement Market (Figure 14.2)
– Generally a bond issue in excess of $10 million
– Bonds do not have to be registered with the SEC
– Avoids public disclosure of information
– Sold only to financial institutions and high net worth investors
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-18
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Midsize Businesses (Cont.)
• Private Placement Market (Cont.)
– Generally not resold by original investor for at least two years
– Have covenants that are generally less restrictive than when
borrowing from a bank
– Terms will be renegotiated one or more times during the life
span of the loan if the company wishes to embark on a new
strategy
7Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-19
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Midsize Businesses (Cont.)
– Private Placement Origination (Figure 14.2)
• Issued through agents, commercial banks or investment
banks who structure the contract and market the issue
• Due diligence—the agent handling the private placement
evaluates the firm’s management, financial condition, and
business capabilities
• Based on due diligence, the placement issue will receive a
formal credit rating which measures the perceived risk
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-20
FIGURE 14.2 Private placement
origination.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-21
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Midsize Businesses (Cont.)
– Private Placement Origination (Figure 14.2) (Cont.)
• The terms of the contract are negotiated to be attractive to investors—
interest rate, maturity, covenants, and any special features
• Offering memorandum/term sheet containing information of the
firm and the offering are sent to prospective investors
• Once the issue is placed, the investors do their own due diligence
which verifies the original information
8Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-22
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Large Businesses
– Firms with assets in excess of $150 million
– Becomes cost effective to enter the public bond
market
– These bond issues are liquid assets that are traded in
the secondary market
– Therefore, can be issued at a lower yield than a
nontraded instrument
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-23
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Large Businesses (Cont.)
– Large businesses can afford the high distribution and
underwriting costs of a public issue
• Additional costs to sell to a wider range of investors
• Substantial costs associated with registering the bond with the SEC
– Securities Underwriting (Figure 14.3)
• Issuer selects an underwriter, generally an investment bank, to assist
in issuing and marketing the bond
• Underwriters actively market their services to companies large enough
to issue in the public market
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-24
FIGURE 14.3 Securities underwriting.
9Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-25
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Large Businesses (Cont.)
– Securities Underwriting (Figure 14.3) (Cont.)
• Underwriter does due diligence on the issuer and then
issues the following items
– Registration Statement—conforms to specific disclosure
requirements
– Offering (preliminary) prospectus—contains all relevant
factual information about the firm and its financing
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-26
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Large Businesses (Cont.)
– Securities Underwriting (Figure 14.3) (Cont.)
• Registration statement is blessed by the underwriter, the
accountants, and issuing firm’s attorneys
• The registration statement is approved by the SEC and can
now be distributed
• Role of underwriter in the distribution
– Underwriting syndicate is formed by the managing underwriter
to share responsibility for distribution the issue and the
underwriting risk
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-27
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Large Businesses (Cont.)
– Securities Underwriting (Figure 14.3) (Cont.)
• Role of underwriter in the distribution (Cont.)
– Underwriting risk occurs when the underwriters make a firm
commitment to sell the bonds at an agreed price (implied interest
rate)
– If bonds sell below this price, underwriter takes a loss
– Underwriting Spread—hope to sell bonds at a higher offering
price, above the commitment price
• It is difficult to incorporate highly restrictive covenants in
publicly traded bonds
10
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-28
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Large Businesses (Cont.)
– Shelf Registration
• Permits the issuer of a public bond to register a dollar
capacity with the SEC
• Draw down on this capacity at any time
• This avoids additional registration requirements
• Permits issuers to respond instantaneously to changing
market conditions
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-29
How Business Obtains Financing
(Cont.)
• Financing Large Businesses (Cont.)
– Large companies with good credit ratings tend to
rely on the commercial paper market for short-
term financing
– Some very large businesses also issue medium-term
notes, which are like commercial paper, except
maturities range from one year to five years
– Also issue equities, through underwriters, which is
another form of external long-term financing
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-30
The Economics of Financial
Contracting
• Figure 14.4 summarizes method and nature of financial
contracting according to firm size.
• The concept of transactions costs helps explain why
firms of different size rely on different financial
contracts to raise funds
• However, to fully understand the differences must rely
on the concept of asymmetric information—buyers
and sellers are not equally informed about the quality
of the product
11
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-31
FIGURE 14.4 Credit market
comparison.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-32
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Asymmetric Information and Financial Contracting
– Adverse Selection
• Caused by asymmetric information before a transaction is
consummated
• Bank loan officer cannot easily tell the difference between high and
low quality borrowers
• Part of the loan officer’s job is to use credit analysis to uncover
relevant information
• Asymmetry of information is particularly acute for small firms since
there is little publicly available information
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-33
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Asymmetric Information and Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
– Adverse Selection (Cont.)
• As a result, loans are often structured such that borrowers
can signal their true quality based on the types of loans
they will accept
– Is owner willing to pledge personal outside assets as collateral or
offer a personal guarantee?
– If owner is not willing, this would signal that they are uncertain
of the future
12
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-34
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Asymmetric Information and Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
– Moral Hazard
• Occurs after the loan is made
• Loan contract may give the firm the incentive to pursue
actions that take advantage of the lender
– If the firm does very well, the owner does not pay more to the
issuer of the bank loan
– If the firm does poorly, the owner’s liability is limited to the
terms of the loan
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-35
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Asymmetric Information and Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
– Moral Hazard (Cont.)
• Therefore, owners disproportionately share in the upside
of increased risk, while lenders disproportionately share in
the downside
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-36
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Contracting and Firm Continuum
– There are things firms can do to convince potential lenders
that they will not engage in risky tactics
– Large firms
• Relatively easy to observe—any risk shifting is easily detected
– Labor contracts are often public knowledge
– Supplier relationships are often well known
– Marketing success or failure is well documented
– Motivated to not switch to high risk activities—the firm’s desire to
maintain their reputation
13
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-37
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Contracting and Firm Continuum (Cont.)
– Large firms (Cont.)
• Therefore, public markets for stocks and bonds will
generally reflect true riskiness of investment strategies,
with prices and yields determined accordingly
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-38
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Contracting and Firm Continuum (Cont.)
– Small firms
• External reputations are difficult to establish
• Most activities are beyond the public’s scrutiny
• Therefore, need proxies to demonstrate they are low risk and
committed to not shifting their risk profiles
– Outside collateral or personal guarantees place more of the owner’s
wealth at risk
– Inside collateral, bank files a lien against collateral
– Loan covenants prevent risk shifting by explicitly constraining borrower
behavior
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-39
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Contracting and Firm Continuum (Cont.)
– Small firms (Cont.)
• Small firms cannot enter into long-term debt contracts
since there is too much flexibility given the incentives to
shift risk
• Therefore, bank loans to small business are typically
made on a short-term basis
14
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-40
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Contracting and Firm Continuum (Cont.)
– Midsize Companies
• Their information problems lie between small and large size
companies
• More visible publicly than small, but more informationally impaired
than large companies
• Still need a financial intermediary at the origination stage to address
adverse selection problems and design a tailor-made contract
• May have access to long-term debt in the private placement market
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-41
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Firm Continuum (Figure 14.5)
– Describes the relationship between information and
market access in terms of a firm continuum
– The larger the firm, greater and more accurate
information becomes available
– As a firm matures there is more access to long-term
financial contracts, first in the private placement
market progressing into publicly traded stocks and
bonds
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-42
FIGURE 14.5 Firm continuum.
15
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-43
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Firm Continuum (Figure 14.5) (Cont.)
– Growth also enables the firm to obtain different
types of short-term credit
– A firm may revert back to a form of financial
contract typically associated with a smaller firm, but
this is consistent with the concept of firm
continuum and the firm will do what is in their best
interest
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-44
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Consumer Lending, Financial Contracting and
Securitization
– Asymmetric information also exists in consumer lending
– Some consumers are high-risk borrowers, some are low-risk
– Adverse selection exists since it might be difficult to
determine the riskiness of a potential borrowers
– Moral hazard is also present since consumers may borrow for
one purpose and switch to a riskier activity
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-45
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Consumer Lending, Financial Contracting
and Securitization (Cont.)
– Consumer lenders use some of the same techniques
as business lenders to solve these problems
– Banks may use subtle pricing schemes to sort out
low-risk borrowers from high-risk ones and permit
loan packages to be tailored for both groups
16
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-46
The Economics of Financial
Contracting (Cont.)
• Consumer Lending, Financial Contracting and
Securitization (Cont.)
– Asymmetric information is probably less in consumer lending
than business lending
• Easier to access consumer risk since personal financial information is
much less complex
• Relatively fewer types of consumer loans so evaluating consumer risk
is easier than business loans
• Collateral virtually eliminates the asymmetry problem
– Easier to securitize consumer loans—pooling a group of
loans into a trust and then selling securities issued against the
trust
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