Tài chính doanh nghiệp - Chapter 16: Regulation of financial institutions

Power Point Slides for: Financial Institutions, Markets, and Money, 9th Edition Authors: Kidwell, Blackwell, Whidbee & Peterson Prepared by: Babu G. Baradwaj, Towson UniversityAndLanny R. Martindale, Texas A&M University 1Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.CHAPTER 16REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS2Copyright© 2005 John Wiley & Sons, IncFinancial institutions are heavily regulated because society heavily depends on them.Financial intermediation necessarily involves “asymmetric information”.Failures of financial institutions involve high social and economic costs.The power to allocate credit is a significant and valuable social and economic power.3Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Financial intermediation necessarily involves “asymmetric information”.Most SSUs cannot expertly gauge a financial institution’s safety or soundness.Regulation is a mechanism for trust without personal verification.Regulators impose uniform standards of safety and soundnessReliance on regulatory standards replaces individual trust in institutionsBenefits of financial intermediation are institutionalized into society4Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Failures of financial institutions involve high social and economic costs.“Fallout” is worse than that of other business failures.Abrupt shrinkage of credit disrupts commerce; economic uncertainty inhibits saving, investing, and social progress;total costs to society typically exceed value of the institution. Regulation is a mechanism for preventing failures, or confining their effects.Regulators monitor safety and soundness proactively; deposit insurance protects against panic; central banks maintain liquidity in system “lenders of last resort.” 5Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.The power to allocate credit is a significant and valuable social and economic power.So significant that government naturally seeks to share it.So valuable that financial institutions accept regulation as a condition of it.6Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Major Banking Laws, 1913-1980 (Exhibit 16.1)7Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Major Banking Laws, 1982-1999 (Exhibit 16.1)8Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Much bank regulation is aimed at preventing bank failures Generally, banks fail for either of 2 reasons:ILLIQUIDITY Inability to disburse cash as promised.INSOLVENCY Insufficiency of assets to cover liabilities.9Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.ILLIQUDITYAn institution may be profitable, but still become illiquid.Too many depositors may withdraw at once.Loan demand may exceed planned funding ability. Too many long-term assets may be funded with short-term liabilities.Failures caused by illiquidity are preventable. Regulators proactively monitor funding practices.Regulators can arrange for emergency funding (e.g. Discount Window).11Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.INSOLVENCYIf investments lose value or if loans default, a bank’s capital can erode.Because banks are highly leveraged, insolvency can happen when asset values fall by a relatively small amount.Regulators emphasize adequate capitalization—Minimum capital standards in terms of risk-weighted assets.Severe sanctions for undercapitalization.12Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Lessons of Past Bank FailuresBy guaranteeing depositors’ funds, the FDIC has effectively prevented runs on institutions it insures.Regional or industrywide depressions are a major cause of bank failures.Fraud, embezzlement, malfeasance, and poor management are the most notable causes of bank failures.13Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.The FDICTwo insurance funds: BIF — Bank Insurance Fund SAIF — Savings Association Insurance FundFDIC insurance mandatory for commercial banks, savings banks & savings associationsCoverage: $100,000 per depositor per institution.14Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.2 Ways the FDIC HandlesFailed BanksPayoff & LiquidationPurchase & Assumption15Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Payoff & LiquidationPay off insured depositorsTake over institution & sell off assetsPay other claimants against institution in order of their priority 16Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Order of claims1) expenses of receiver2) depositorsFDIC as successor to insured depositors already paid partial settlement with uninsured depositors depending on proceeds of liquidation3) general creditors4) subordinated creditors5) shareholders 17Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.18Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Purchase & AssumptionTake over and operate institution as going concernFind new ownership for institution and/or selected assets—“Clean Bank”—buyer can “put” troubled assets back to FDIC “Whole Bank”—buyer assumes entire balance sheetGuarantee deposits but don’t pay off depositors; hand them over to new management19Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.20Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Deposit Insurance IssuesMoral Hazard“Too Big to Fail”“Policing”Premiums21Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Moral HazardReduces incentive of depositors to be carefulIncreases temptation of depository institutions to “gamble” on higher risksCoverage is limited or “capped” for this reason. Uninsured depositors may take losses.22Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.“Too Big to Fail”To protect the economy, the government implicitly promises full bailout of the largest institutionsThis creates a “two-tiered” banking industryThis adds to the temptation of the largest institutions to “gamble”Of course the government does not explicitly say which banks it would save23Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.“Policing”Insurance Agencies as “Police”: Depositors aren’t worried. They have no incentive to withdraw funds from an institution even if it is taking many risks. Deposit insurance funds must thus have a “police” mentality—try to protect the public who no longer protect themselves. This is a major reason institutions must be regularly examined.Stockholders and Creditors as “Police”: No insurance for them. If a bank is very risky, buyers of its securities will demand a very high return. Thus the capital market imposes a risk premium for risky banks. Bank examinations are costly and infrequent, but investors will monitor bank risk-taking and bid prices of the bank’s securities up or down as appropriate. 24Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.PremiumsFor many years all banks paid the same premium rateNow premiums increase or decrease depending on—capitalization examiner ratings25Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Bank Examination All U.S. depository institutions are regularly examined by at least one regulator. For National Banks, it is the OCC—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.For state banks who are members of the Federal Reserve System, it is the Federal Reserve and the state banking agency.For nonmember state banks it is the FDIC and the state banking agency.26Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Safety & Soundness ExaminationsPromote and maintain safe and sound bank operating practicesProcedure includes: bank financial information collected quarterly (call reports) on-site bank examinations discussion of findings with management “CAMELS” rating 27Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.CAMELS Ratings1 (Best) to 5 (Worst) in each of 6 areas:Capital adequacyAsset qualityManagement competencyEarningsLiquiditySensitivity to Market Risk28Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.CAMELS Rating System (Exhibit 16.5)29Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Other ExaminationsCommunity Reinvestment Act complianceConsumer complianceTrust Department examinations as applicable30Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Structure & Competition RegulationsBranchingDeposit Rate CeilingsCommercial banking vs. Investment BankingFinancial Services Modernization ActBalance Sheet Restrictions31Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.BranchingFor years branching was tightly controlled and subject to conflicting state regulations as well as ambiguous federal regulations.Interstate branching required approval of all states involved.Bank holding companies evolved as a regulatory avoidance technique.Today, after the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994—All banks can freely branch across state lines as long as it is through acquisition of another bank or branch.If allowed by state law, a bank can create a new branch (“de novo” branching) across state lines.32Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Deposit Rate CeilingsUntil 1980 “Reg Q” rate ceilings kept institutions from competing directly.Ceilings are gone now, but “innovation around” them left us with—MMDAsMMMFsNOW Accounts33Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Commercial Banking vs. Investment BankingGlass-Steagall restrictions were gradually relaxed in the 1980s and 1990s.Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 repealed most restrictions, allowing U.S. commercial banks affiliated subsidiaries for— investment banking insurance other financial activities34Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999Banks can have securities and insurance subsidiariesA new organizational form, financial holding companies (FHCs), can have many different kinds of financial institutions as subsidiariesInsurance companies and securities firms can acquire commercial banks and form FHCs with Federal Reserve approvalInstitutions must obey new privacy rules about sharing customer informationFederal Reserve is “umbrella” supervisor over FHCs while bank and nonbank subsidiaries fall under of other regulators (“functional regulation”).35Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Balance Sheet RestrictionsBanks cannot hold equity securitiesBanks cannot lend more than 15% of capital to one borrowerMost banks cannot hold securities rated less than “investment grade”Regulators impose minimum liquidity and capital requirements36Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Consumer Protection RegulationsState usury laws - loan rate ceilingsTruth in Lending (1968)Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974; 1976)Fair Credit Billing Act (1974)Community Reinvestment Act (1978)Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970/Fair &Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 200337Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Bank Regulators50 state banking agenciesFDIC (BIF; SAIF)Federal ReserveOffice of the Comptroller of the CurrencyOffice of Thrift Supervision38Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Division of Responsibilities Among Bank Regulators (Exhibit 16.6)39Copyright© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.