A comparative study on goals of competition law with the case of merger regulation and recommendations to Viet Nam

research, it was one of three underlying regimes of Japanese anti-monopoly law’s objectives extracted from Art. 138.i According to Iy- ori Hiroshi, like what Masako analyzed, the JAA con- ducts this aim mainly to restrict “unreasonable re- straint of trade” under chapter II, which takes place for the private monopolization39. Japanese merger regulation later made it divergent for the definition of “unreasonable restraint of trade” from this aspect. In reality, the interpretation of this phenomenon under the Japanese perspective has been different from the US’s application of a similar test under the Sherman Act39. Overall, what is addressed in Art.1 makes sense regarding the goals of the Japanese anti-monopoly regime. Among the diversity of critical objectives, the promotion of “fair and free competition” seems to be the underlying principle due to its initial statement in the Article and its clear definition in the Art. 2 4.j And, the phrase “and thereby secure the interests of general consumers” (40 Art. 1) could mean that the protection of consumer’s interests remains signif- icant and becomes a priority even though it has not appeared frequently41,42. Regarding how this objective locates, one could rec- ognize that it has resulted from the foremost goals and the specific branch of law. In the merger reg- ulation, the JFTC’s Merger Guidelines sounds to be familiar with the US approach. Explicitly, it defined themarket power, or the outcomes of “lessening com- petition,” raised by the merger as consequences of decreasing output, diminishing innovation, or oth- erwise harmful conditions to customers rather than what is expressed in general in the Art. 2 4 (34 Sec. 1,43 Part III.1.B.). Japan has a sophisticated approach in determining the goals for the anti-monopoly law. The interpreta- tion needs more practical aspects, which could make iTwo other regimes consist of the promotion of fair and free com- petition and the protection of consumers’ interests. j“the JAA” Art. 1 & 2. 1257 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law andManagement, 5(1):1253-1266 Japan’s direction altered in practice because of, for ex- ample, the various targets in economic development, especially the incentives for industrial policy. There- fore, it contributes to supply the diversity for Japan’s approach even though it seems to approach the pro- tection of consumer welfare like the US. On the EU inauguration of effective compe- tition It would not be too strict in tackling the EU competi- tion law’s goals. Initially, in almost all situations, the discussions first and foremost mentioned the EU’s at- tempts in making rules for the protection of compe- tition, particularly the process of competition, then moved to the other afterward. Overall, the EU’s fun- damental competition rules were for the “vibrant and competitive economy”44,45. On the one hand, the experts applied the competition policy to the “allocative efficiency” 46. When there ap- peared problems, notably raised on the neo-classical economic theory of perfect competition, on the other hand, the emphasis gave a movement, even from the “fairness and economic freedom,” for the workable competition, or contestable markets1,47–49.k Ulti- mately, the concept of “effective competition,” the best imperfect competition,” stops the arguments as a significant achievement for the EU’s competition law48–50. The most crucial legal inclusions for this aim are the legal documents for competition law in the EU. From the ECT to the TFEU, the EU has remained to re- gard “competition,” notably the “fair competition” on the preamble51.l However, in practice, the EU court expanded the objective to the “effective com- petition”52,53. As a result, for this goal, both the EU Merger Regulation 1989 and the EU Merger Regula- tion 2004 attempt to combat incompatiblemergers for “the need to maintain and develop effective compe- tition in the common market”54,55.m This objective accordingly has spread broadly till now. Notwithstanding, the ongoing discussion emphasizes the EU’s competition law to address consumer wel- fare19,20,48. The EU merger regulation could not lose this pathway on direction against the adverse effects of the marker power or monopolization56. Therefore, the arguments suggest that the merger’s substantive test mostly concerns consumers’ “expense” on antic- ipating its anti-competitive effects57. In other words, kThe goals were frequently mentioned before the EU economic modernization. lArt. 81,52 Art. 85,53 Art. 102. mFor example, recital 14 for the former citation and the recital 23 for the latter one. competition agencies must evaluate the merger based on “its impact on consumer surplus”58, and the appli- cation of remedies for anti-competitive mergers pro- vide a matching contribution59. The others also prove the multi-approaches in out- lining the EU competition law’s goals50,60,61.n Re- cently, Gerbrandy Anna has ever based the discussion on the EU “economic constitution” to aim the goals of competition law for its internal market modern- ization. The study attempted to prove that it would not be necessary only to bring the competition policy for consumer protection47. In his Speech in 2001, the previous Commissioner Mario Monti stated that “the goal of competition policy, in all its aspects, is to pro- tect consumer welfare bymaintaining a high degree of competition in the common market.” He meant that, on protecting consumers’ interests, the merger con- trol would not be “against mergers that create more efficient firms”62. Unsurprisingly familiar, Georges Vallindas also concerned about the ultimate conse- quence of reducing prices for consumers even men- tioned the industrial policy with its promotion of “op- tional allocation resources”46. This aspect has attracted much attention and sup- ports. On top of the writing, EstevaMosso Carles also made sure that the merger control rules need to pre- serve the “competitive market structures” along with ensuring that “consumers fully enjoy the benefits of competition63. Other scholars also considered the consumer welfare “in the technical at all,” and require the competitive process for the market. They inter- preted that the allocative and productive efficiency of such a process of effective competition also results in consumer benefits48. As a result, the EUMerger Guidelines 2004 and 2008, for example, officially clarify that the “effective com- petition” that the EU merger regulation aims to pro- tect and preserve would “bring benefits to consumers” ultimately ( 55 at para.8,60,64 at para.10,65). Under Monti Giorgio’s observation, the EU moves towards economic efficiency and consumer welfare other than competition and the internal market’s integration1.o In detail, the effective competition on the market could contribute to the “low price, high-quality prod- ucts, a wide selection of goods and services, and in- novation” (64at para.10,66 at para.8). The protection of competition in merger control, in turn, benefits consumers regularly. As Johannes Laitenberger’s new nAlso, it is impossible to identify the single goals of competition law in either the US or the EU. oAmong there “core” values of competition, market integration, and economic efficiency, the EU in the past also aimed the last value at consumer welfare. 1258 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law andManagement, 5(1):1253-1266 Speech, the EU competition law with its a-few-year- old infant merger control ensures consumers’ profits from products and services even though it has sup- plied different thorough 25 years67. It is practical to focus that the law’s individual goal supplies the similarity and, particularly, differences among legal systems. To a certain extent, along with the specific diverse approaches, the common objec- tives could converge these countries in theoretical and practical aspects. Indeed, one could recognize the conventional approach in competition law goals in the EU from the US and Japan perspectives. In prac- tice, the US’s “ideas, theories, and insights” affect the cEU’s debate and even “rage over the application of EU rules”49. For example, Georges Valindas has cited Richard Posner for the recent discussion on “the only legitimate aim of competition law”46,68.p THEMANIFEST SKETCHOF COMPETITION POLICY’S GOALS IN VIETNAM Thenecessaryemphasison thediverseobjec- tives To aim the law to restrictions on anti-competitive be- haviors, monopolizing processes, and any activities against the competitive environment, the explanation on the bill of competition law’s adjustment in 2018 ex- pressed that the new law on competition directs to the protection of fair and justice competition and thereby supply the driving force to economic development69. Soon before, the bill also stated that competition law needs to bring the goals to protect the enterprises’ and consumers’ legal interests70. It sounds that the law functions brighter than the previous version; how- ever, as seniors, the bill was confusing in front of the law’s multi goals. Of course, it could be simple to fol- low the regimes of unified interest rather than plu- ral ones, such as the workable competition concen- tration as the Chicago school’s approach71. The selec- tion comes with the reason that it is not always easy to combine diverse objectives71. The convergence and divergences of the US, Japan, and EU’s competition regimes could tell meaningful stories. The above discussion sounds that these three legal sys- tems converge to protect consumer welfare at the end. More excitingly, Japan and the EU are closer to their multi-approaches in the competition law’s objectives, even though the EU merely appears bright with the statement that “effective competition brings benefits pFor an historical perspective of the Chicago andHarvard Schools to consumers,” for example, in its merger regulation (64 at para.10,66 at para.8). The EU historical enforce- ment also evidenced the consumer welfare in its con- tribution44. Of course, it should note the small but significant difference between the EU and Japan, in which the EU regards the “effective competition” oth- erwise the “fair and free competition” of Japan. In actuality, the analysis of Japan’s approach above re- veals that Japan has been unsurprisingly reflecting the perspective of more complex plural interests. In Art. 1 of the JAA, Japan pronouns that the purpose of the law is: • to promote fair and free competition, stimulate the creative initiative of enterprise, encourage business activity, heighten the level of employ- ment and actual national income, and thereby promote the democratic and wholesome devel- opment of the national economy as well as se- cure the interests of general consumers ( 40 Art. 1). In practice, several countries have turned the compe- tition law to solve various problems like Japan and the EU; however, they popularly highly select only one concern as the priority3,41,71. Brightly, the EU does not often aim the competition at its end, but mainly for consumer interests. For Japan, the expression ap- pears to be that it mainly targets the preservation of competition, and “thereby,” the consumers’ interests would be the primary outcomes of such a promotion, especially in merger regulation. It seems that the US does not count many goals for its antitrust law. In history, typically, it intended to halt trust and economic concentration. Like one of Japan’s goal, it thus concerned “public interest” and was not reluctant to recognize “advantages of cheap- ness or better service which honest, intelligent coop- eration may bring” at the same time72. One could find the approach to public interests in cases of Stan- dard Oil Company of New Jersey et al. v. United States (1911), United States v. American Tobacco Com- pany and American Tobacco Company v. United States (1911), or Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (1962). However, the school of Chicago’s arguments has changed theUS approach in the 1970s. Be running far away from “the progressive or populist political pref- erences,” the merger regulation as well as the antitrust law in general, the discussions aimed the sole goal to the “consumer welfare”73. Consequently, almost all mergers have been recognized with their efficiencies, which, as economic logic, benefit consumers at the end74,75. Thus, the merger review has begun to chal- lengemergers whose effects have been not cost-saving 1259 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law andManagement, 5(1):1253-1266 mostly or, in contrast, increasing prices or reducing market outputs75. Of course, there have been controversial ideas that the law needs to consider other criteria such as, for example, to restrict the big business’s impacts and send a promotion to the small alongside such pro- tection of consumers, significantly as affected by the populist from the 19th century 14,75,76.q Alternatively, some counterarguments pointed out themassive con- sumption of consumer welfare standard, which “has allowed too many mergers to create too much con- centration in too many markets”77. Ultimately, mar- ket power has become the most critical concern in the merger regulation78. When the merger gener- ates benefits, such as the economic scales’ efficiency, it could favor consumers. Adversely, the merger law could detect and prohibit market powers, leading to monopolization and ten to injure consumers in the future. The other jurisdictions accordingly have con- verged with the EU at this point. Of course, the suspension of theVCLmeans that Viet- nam finds challenges in mastering the objectives for its competition law. Under the market power ap- proach above, the perspectives of Japan and the EU could contribute significant experience. It implies that the primary goal of themerger law needs to be the protection of competition because it, in turn, would bring other effects to the market as well as consumers and other market players. Moreover, “thereby,” from the problems of market power raised by the busi- ness plan, the merger regulation could anticipate the lessening competition from various aspects, includ- ing the decreasing output, releasing innovation, or other types of dangers on consumers ( 34 Sec.1,43 Part III.1.B.). Some scholars in Vietnam also made acquainted with this prospect. They identified that the law, which is to protect competition, is to protect themarket andother economic factors, such as consumers. However, they included the enterprise and other business operators into the “other economic factor”79. Currently, it evidences that Vietnam has approached the plural interests regarding the goals for the compe- tition law in general. The scholars proved that compe- tition law in Vietnam needs to ensure various kinds of interests3,9. To be familiar with this approach, Viet- nam needs to have perceived its necessary empha- sis3,71. Indeed, the construction of regulatory priori- ties should depend upon the economic foundation80. Mostly, to absorb this approach, the writing proposes that Vietnam should pay attention to the “effective qAs cited fromHans B.Thorelli,The Federal Antitrust Policy, 180- 85, 1955. competition” experienced from the EU’s aspect. Nat- urally, the “free and fair competition” has become an- cient and may lead to some obstacle for the economy nowadays48,49. As suggested by some Vietnamese scholars71, the approach to the workable competi- tion also brings meaningless evidence48,49. Overall, to achieve the market with effective competition and priority of consumer welfare could bring the law op- portunities to restrictions on anti-competitive treat- ments as what preference of law, the scholars pointed out3. To an apparent position of the industrial policy The discussions in OECD’s round table in 2009 showed that competition policy in practice could play as a useful tool for backing to industrial policy’s per- formance to the stable economy in scale effect. It can primarily prevent the domestic market from foreign monopolistic companies’ predatory pricing activities, make a driving force to new industries, and reforms of technologies and management for companies’ ac- complishment80. Interestingly, competition policy can exist whenever an industrial policy’s positive im- pacts donot balance enoughmalicious attacks by anti- competitive reactions81. Therefore, the implementa- tion of industrial policy should position in a parallel stage with competition policy, and vice versa, for the provincial economy’s productivity. What happened in Japan in history can be an interest- ing illustration of “obvious success and understand- ably legitimized government intervention in the econ- omy”82. Partially, it was of the vigorous enforcement of industrial policy for the relationship between en- terprises and investment, which, as Japanese recogni- tion, was the driving force for its historical hot eco- nomic development83. In other words, the relaxation of competition law enforcement played an essential role in contributing to the Japanese priorities in eco- nomic reconstruction84. At the time, the JFTC and MITI had no visible “animosity” after the JAA ad- justments in 1953. At that time, the legislation be- came more relaxation reacting to the vivid elasticity of economic conditions and its relevant industrial pol- icy84,85. It thereby released the JFTC’s burden in front of the new competition policy. In merger control, merger plans face the prohibition only when they were “may substantially restrain com- petition,” or when “unfair trade practices have been employed” in the course of transactions85–87.r The rThemost important additional rule in the amendment 1953 was the unfair business practice. Moreover, it should be noted that the base of “substantially restrain competition” was also enacted for cartel regulation. It means the cartel per se illegal was deleted. 1260 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law andManagement, 5(1):1253-1266 critical base of “substantially restrains competition” was continuously allayed any merger which even sub- stantially restrains competition in any particular field of trade was still approved if “it is particularly neces- sary for the attainment of rationalization.” It resulted that “the number of violation cases taken by the JFTC was decreased” in response to the new regulation with the “co-called preventive or supplementary provisions concerning restrictive business practices were deleted from the JAA”88. It can be said that the motivation for these changes came from the factual elements in the Japanese econ- omy and society. The termination of the Japanese – Korean War with the Peace Treaty in 1951 had sig- nificantly affected, resulting in the alteration in the United States’ policy to Japan, which played a vital role in the Japanese economy at the time36,81,83,87,88.s Accordingly, such an attitude was towards “allowing the smoother and easier introduction of foreign capi- tal and procurement of capital which were very much needed for Japan to attain economic reconstruction more rapidly”88. Of course, these circumstances got down, the role of industrial policy did not have enough reasons to jus- tify, the revitalization time of competition law and policy started, and JAA’s enforcement has become more and more durable. Instead of the subordinated tenets among the competition and industrial policy before the 1990s, like the typical model, the Japanese competition law nowadays, on the whole, includes “more clout” and “more powerful, independent, vis- ible, and active”89. Indeed, it has more demand for actively enhancing the JAA even though it has already directed “the value of competition and markets”89. Alongside tackling competition law goals and pursu- ing them, if introduced, Vietnam needs a clear insight into the industrial policy and different policies and le- gal frameworks for trade and economic development. It does not mean that Vietnam should eliminate such policies. However, it is reasonable to suggest a dis- tinction in which Vietnam could find the appropriate pathway in incorporation with the competition law and policy implementation. There are several pieces of evidence that Vietnam has much underlined the industrial policy. The remark- able proof could be the emphasis on the development of state-owned enterprises90. The Resolution of the National Congress of the Communist Party of Viet- nam in 2001 strongly presented its statement to bring such actors as national champions to enhance their sMoreover, such a US’ policy was considered as a way to make Japan as 2bulwark against communist infiltration” in East side of the world. domestic and international competitiveness.t More importantly, the VCL 2018 also reflects this aspect at Art. 6. Undoubtedly, these orients come at a price90, especially for the approach that, for the do- mestic enterprise and economy’s strength, the compe- tition law’s existence under the several improvements of market-oriented institutional plays a vital role91. By contrast, alongside the Vietnamese economy’s im- mature entrepreneurship, there was even the idea to deny the competition law’s soon existence, especially the extreme restriction as to the western model3. Others argued that Vietnam, which seems to have a strong demand for government support from the in- dustrial policy on the initial economic transformation progress, lacks conditions to enforce the competition policy12. However, the current debate rejected the suggestions that other relevant laws could drive the competition policy, and even different norms such as, for example, bankrupted dissolutions or market natural extortion, could turn corporations into effec- tive ways3. The opponents argued that other laws find challenges to function as the competition law’s hands80. As a result, the Vietnamese competition law was born. It is not strange when Vietnam still introduces its in- dustrial policy. Nonetheless, Vietnam has been cur- rently confusing in the involvement of competition policy and industrial policy. The previous mention of the embarrassing targets on competition in tan- dem with collusion could prove that Vietnam had no solutions for the peaceful relationship between these two policies. At least, Vietnam presents no drastically definitive statement for competition90. For the same situation where there has been the existing competi- tion law, Vietnam could learn Japan to select the pri- ority policy. Yes, it at first need a distinction between the competition policy and industrial policy. However, it should be aware that Japan permitted a justified policy on the industry in history when it did not provide much consumption of merger remedies. Undoubtedly, merger remedies could not function to implement the industrial policy, but it could clear the desirable mergers that could meet the industrial pol- icy achievement. In other words, the direction of mergers could go on even it has not needed more re- laxation on competition law. More importantly, the proposed mergers also provide not anti-competitive effects with appropriate merger remedies. In practice, Vietnam challenges to obligate the policy to enhance state-owned companies’ effectiveness; and tackle the practical aspect that the existing monopoly t Sec. 4.1 ofThe Strategy for Socio-Economic Development 2001- 2010. 1261 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law andManagement, 5(1):1253-1266 mostly comes from such a business sector91. It es- pecially made sense when the state-owned company was under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which has also been authorized to implement the competi- tion law and policy in Vietnam91. In several circum- stances, moreover, Vietnam positioned other Min- istries as dispute settlers in merger cases. For exam- ple, the Ministry of Information and Communica- tions has mainly stood in the cases of VNPT and Vi- ettel and EVN Telecom and Viettel91. In practice, the context of industrial policy in Viet- nam has been changing in front of the policy toward competition. Vietnam recently stated that it aims to put the public sector and private one into an equal competing ground under the market-based mecha- nism(16 Sec. 4.1). However, there is an obstacle in which there has been misunderstanding about the state economic sector’s position. For instance, the present ideas may not identify that the state-owned economy’s concentration does notmean that Vietnam aims to create and maintain a monopoly13,91. No- tably, the accessible insight has been a not clear dis- tinction of the monopoly’s harmful effects and the in- effective factual management in state-owned monop- olist71. These have affected to solve problems on the relationship between the industrial and competition policies in Vietnam, particularly for the business sec- tor of state-owned enterprises. As a result, there has been a tendency toward industrial policy’s goal even if there is an existing statement that the implementation of competition law needs to be more strengthened. One more time, Vietnam has a remaining pathway in the VCL 2018. In detail, it also provides that other ministries shall corporate with the competition au- thority for “the state management of the competition” (92 Art. 7.3. ). It should be to remind that, after the period of the industrial policy’s dominance, Japan makes JFTC strengthen and independent. Other gov- ernmental agencies also construct their Divisions of competition; however, these latter ones play roles in enhancing competitiveness as partially the industrial policy targets. Notably, theMITI also has its competi- tion division, but it does not remain the competition policy implementation as in history. In brief, Viet- nam needs to concern the problems when it calls for other administrative authorities in making competi- tion law enforcement. In the final, it should restate the suggestion that Viet- nam needs an apparent distinction between compe- tition law and industrial policy. It is even that Viet- nam could maintain and send its industrial one pref- erence but in the other active pathway. Under the perception that competition law does not prohibit the monopoly, it just supplies the restriction on unlawful monopolization and monopolist’s treatments93. As a result, themost vital tool to avoid the conflict between these two policies, Vietnamneeds to aim its successful merger enforcement to merge remedy applications as others74. CONCLUSION Thegoals of competition law and policy play a notable navigator in law enforcement and lead to new rule in- auguration regimes. However, Vietnam avoids signi- fying its goals in all two competition law versions, the VCL 2004 and the recent VCL 2018. There appears an increasing debate in the academic world in which competition law goals have been outlined in several ways. Indeed, Vietnam has a demand to look at more de- veloped countries for future policies to harmonize merger control law. According to some experts, Japan’s experience can “provide useful lessons” for developing countries or transitional economies94.u Moreover, Japan is the leading country participating in merger deals in Vietnam, which is forecasted to continue in the coming years95–97. Aside from the US, Japan, and the EU merger regulations, there are suitable choices in a comparative study. Overall, it implies that Vietnam, in its current progress, could remain the diverse objectives for com- petition law enforcement. Under the approach to plu- ral interests, Vietnammust identify ones, or only one, for priority. From other legal systems’ perspectives, it sounds that Vietnam should mainly direct the “effec- tive competition” particularly experienced from the EU’s aspect. Traditionally, the “free and fair competi- tion” may be fluently perceived, but it seems too ab- stract and outdated. The formula of workable com- petition could supply significant aspects that impact the enhancement of firms’ competitiveness. Finally, consumer welfare could have remained for further achievements. At present, effective competition could partially target this goal. Notably, Vietnam needs to maintain the distinction between competition policy and industrial policy. These two policies usually run along but for two dif- ferent goals, which could be a conflict or reciprocity sometimes. The enforcement of competition law and policy meets the industrial policy’s demand in the cir- cumstances does not pronounce that the two regu- lations always supply familiar outcomes. Of course, uThe researcher pointed out that “the text of a legal transplant is only one important consideration. Additionally, the context of com- petition law and the subtext of changes to the existing norms of eco- nomic regulation may be just as important to ’importing’ antitrust law into developing nations or transitional economies.” 1262 Science & Technology Development Journal – Economics - Law andManagement, 5(1):1253-1266 Vietnam could not destroy this for that one. However, to experience Japanese historical treatments, Vietnam could find the appropriate direction to peacefully ex- ecute the industrial policy under supporting condi- tions of the competition law and policy. As navigators, the stipulated goals would drive law en- forcement precisely and powerfully. Not only merger regulation but also other branches of competition law need to be motivated by these pilots. Thus, further studies of competition law goals must expand into regulations on the cartel, market dominance, et cetera. Future research on merger control necessarily con- cerns how the legal goals drive themerger review, par- ticularly in assessing mergers’ outcomes. In all, prac- tical enforcement under the pilot of competition law objectives has a significant demand for deep consid- eration. ABBREVIATIONS DOJThe (US) Department of Justice ECT The European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty (the Treaty of Rome in 1957) EU. The European Union FTCThe (US) Federal Trade Commission JAAThe Japanese Antimonopoly Act MITIThe (Japan)Ministry of International Trade and Industry OECDThe Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development TFEU The (EU) Treaty on the Functioning of the Union USThe United States VCL Vietnamese competition law CONFLICTS OF INTEREST The author declares that she has no conflicts of inter- est. AUTHORS’ CONTRIBUTIONS Truong Trong Hieu has done all works of the article as a sole author. REFERENCES 1. Monti G. EC competition law. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press. 2007;p. 527. 2. 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Nghiên cứu so sánh vềmục tiêu của luật cạnh tranh với trường hợp kiểm soát sáp nhập và các khuyến nghị cho Việt Nam Trương Trọng Hiểu* Use your smartphone to scan this QR code and download this article TÓM TẮT Mục tiêu của luật và chính sách cạnh tranh đóng vai trò định hướng cho quán trình thực thi lẫn xây dựng pháp luật. Dù vậy, Việt Nam đã hai lần bỏ qua việc xác định mục tiêu này khi thông qua Luật cạnh tranh năm 2004 và 2018. Kiểm soát sáp nhập trên thực tế vì vậy cũng khá lúng túng. Tiếp nối những tranh luận học thuật lâu nay, bài viết mở ra hướng tiếp cận so sánh với các nền pháp lý khác. Không phải pháp luật cạnh tranh sớm nhất châu Á là Nhật Bản hay nền pháp luật lớn và mới là Châu Âu mà luật chống độc quyền Hoa Kỳ đóng vai trò đưa ra hướng tiếp cận cơ bản cho vấn đề này. Kinh nghiệm các nước cho thấy, Việt Nam có thể duy trình mô hình đa mục tiêu cùng với việc nhấn mạnh nhóm lợi ích ưu tiên cho luật cạnh tranh. Bỏ qua tiếp cận về cạnh tranh tự do và bình đẳng hay cạnh tranh khả thi, phân tích hướng đến cạnh tranh hiệu quả dựa trên tiếp cận chính yếu của châu Âu. Đặc biệt, quá trình thực thi chỉ thật sự hiệu quả khi các chính sách thúc đẩy cạnh tranh khác được định vị một cách rõ ràng. Tuy nhiên, chính sách công nghiệp, dù có kết nối quan trọng với chính sách cạnh tranh, không phải sẽ luôn hỗ trợ cho quá trình thực thi luật cạnh tranh. Kinh nghiệm lịch sử của Nhật Bản sẽ giới thiệu định hướng phù hợp trong xử lý mối quan hệ phức tạp giữa hai chính sách vừa có sự xung đột vừa có tính tương hỗ này. Đây là những gợi ý góp phần cho việc pháp điển hóa pháp luật cạnh tranh ở Việt Nam. Từ khóa: Luật cạnh tranh, chính sách cạnh tranh, chính sách công nghiệp, mục tiêu, kiểm soát sáp nhập Cite this article : Hiểu T T. Nghiên cứu so sánh về mục tiêu của luật cạnh tranh với trường hợp kiểm soát sáp nhập và các khuyến nghị cho Việt Nam. Sci. Tech. Dev. J. - Eco. Law Manag.; 5(1):1253-1266. 1266 History  Nhận bài: 11/8/2020  Chấp nhận: 10/11/2020  Xuất bản: 13/2/2021